Zitat Jemen – eine unglaubliche Verleumdung - natürlich ohne jede persönliche Kenntnis der Zusammenhänge (oder warst Du etwa dabei Jemen-Moskito ?)

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Richtig ist jedoch, dass die, die Kuba in den 80er und 90er Jahren verlassen haben, nicht unbedingt zur Creme der kubanischen Gesellschaft gehörten. Es waren viele Kriminelle und wohl auch einige Kranke darunter. Insgesamt also eher ein heilender Aderlaß für Kuba.

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Die ist die unglaubliche Geschichte der Flucht hunderttausender Menschen aus Kuba im Jahre 1980. Auch heute, fast 25 Jahre später wirkt diese noch unwirklich und doch so aktuell und glaubwürdig als wäre sie gestern geschehen.

The Peruvian Embassy Crisis and the Mariel Boatlift

1. Die Botschaftskrise

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The Cuban guards stationed at the three entrances to the compound shot at the bus, even though the gate-crashers were unarmed; one of the guards was caught in the crossfire and killed.

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Die kubanischen Wachen welche an den drei Eingängen postiert waren, schossen auf den Bus, obwohl die Insassen des das Tor durchbrechenden Busses unbewaffnet waren. Bei dem Schusswechsel geriet einer der Wachen in das Kreuzfeuer und wurde getötet.

In May 1979, a few Cuban nationals began smuggling themselves into Latin American embassies to request political asylum. The Venezuelan and Peruvian embassies were the most popular choices. By March 1980, close to thirty Cubans had crashed their vehicles through the entrances of these embassies and taken refuge in the compounds, sparking angry exchanges between the government of Cuba and those of Venezuela and Peru. On January 5, the Venezuelan government recalled its ambassador to protest "the heavy-handed measures used by the Cubans in dealing with forcible entries at its Embassy." At the Peruvian embassy, the ambassador agreed to turn over twelve Cuban nationals—including children—who entered the compound illegally on January 21. The Peruvian government subsequently recalled him, and the twelve Cubans were returned to the embassy.

On March 28, six Cubans stole a bus and crashed through the Peruvian embassy gates. The Cuban guards stationed at the three entrances to the compound shot at the bus, even though the gate-crashers were unarmed; one of the guards was caught in the crossfire and killed. The new ambassador refused to turn these gate-crashers over for criminal prosecution. On April 4, Good Friday, Castro pulled all Cuban guards from around the embassy compound and sent in steamrollers to tear down the embassy gates and barricades. In a radio broadcast later that afternoon, Castro stated that his government would no longer risk the lives of its soldiers to protect "criminals."

2. Die Flucht in die Botschaft

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Within forty-eight hours, approximately 10,800 men, women, and children had taken refuge inside the Peruvian embassy. These people were a cross section of Cuban society in age and occupation: students, housewives, factory and construction workers, writers, and even government bureaucrats.

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Innerhalb von 48 Stunden flohen ungefähr 10.800 Männer, Frauen und Kinder in die peruanische Botschaft. Diese Leute bildeten einen Querschnitt der kubanischen Gesellschaft hinsichtlich Alter und Beruf: Studenten, Hausfrauen, Arbeiter und Bauarbeiter, Schriftsteller, ja sogar Regierungsangestellte.

As news of the event spread through the city of Havana, people left their homes and jobs and drove to the embassy to observe. Many left their cars by the side of the road and quietly walked into the embassy compound. One bus driver, in the middle of his daily route, simply got off the bus, told his passengers to wait for the next bus, and entered the compound. Within forty-eight hours, approximately 10,800 men, women, and children had taken refuge inside the Peruvian embassy. These people were a cross section of Cuban society in age and occupation: students, housewives, factory and construction workers, writers, and even government bureaucrats. On Easter Sunday, when the compound was filled to capacity, Cuban police put up barricades all around the perimeter of the embassy—and for several blocks beyond—and prohibited anyone else from entering.

For days the fate of the refugees was uncertain. Rumors circulated that the police were going to arrest or shoot them, prompting some to change their minds and leave the compound; others simply could not tolerate the cramped conditions. The refugees at the embassy sent messages to the Vatican and to President Carter and other heads of state, requesting assistance in leaving Cuba. While they waited for international aid, conditions within the camp steadily worsened. The Cubans were so densely packed inside the lot that many had to sit on tree branches, iron gratings, and the roof of the embassy building. Sleep was virtually impossible. Two babies were born in the compound (one of them was later named "Peru"). For almost a week, the refugees endured the rain and the hot tropical sun. With little food or water, they had to improvise: some ate the leaves of plants and shrubs, while others roasted cats and birds over small wood fires. Even the ambassador's pet parrot became one family's meal. Cuban officials eventually sent in cartons of food, but never enough to feed everyone, and fights broke out among the tired, frightened, and hungry "inmates." Portable toilets were eventually provided, but not before the lot became covered with mud, urine, and excrement. To impose some semblance of order, the refugees created their own governing body and elected twenty-one men and women to distribute food and bolster morale. The committee also helped break up fights, some of which were reportedly caused by the provocadores the government sent in.

Thousands of onlookers gathered around the compound each day. Some hoped to be allowed into the compound; others were there as an act of support for the government. Granma, the official state newspaper, called the refugees "delinquents, social deviants, vagrants, and parasites" and blamed them for all the ills that plagued Cuban society. One article declared that crime had dropped 55 percent since the gusanos had entered the embassy. The government refused to perceive the situation at the embassy as either an act of defiance or an indictment of the revolution; rather, it was a temporary crisis that would ultimately strengthen Cuba's national character. With the nineteenth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion a few days away, the government compared the Peruvian embassy crisis to the 1961 crisis, predicting that Cuba would triumph against this "army of delinquents" as it had against the forces of Yankee imperialism nineteen years earlier. Pedro Ortiz Cabrera, the guard killed in the initial entry, became the martyr and symbol of this new moral campaign, and the state used his death to rally public support. Editorials in the Cuban press fueled the passions of loyal citizens. The Peruvian embassy became a symbol of everything that was wrong with the country, and many Cubans vented their anger against those who took refuge there. People taunted and insulted the refugees and threw stones and rotted food at them. The Cuban police participated in the harassment, beating those on the outer periphery of the compound, unleashing their dogs on them, and blinding the refugees with reflector lights at night. Candelaria Garcia, who lived a few blocks from the embassy and whose husband was one of the 10,800, remembered how tense those days were:

People kept arriving with children and with bags full of food, and they would settle themselves on people's front porches hoping that the embassy would open once again. People came from the interior [of the island] on trucks. Many people were shouting "Down with Fidel," and I said, "Oh God, there's going to be a revolution." That's when the people from the Comites[ Committees for the Defense of the Revolution] came out with clubs. I put a barricade on my door... because my husband was one of the people at the embassy and I thought that someone might break down the door, or whatever... because that's what they were doing to those who were against Fidel. With my husband at the embassy what were they going to think of me? One of the members of the Comite told me, "I saw you walk to the embassy with your husband," and I said, "Yes, but I didn't go in." The things that went on in Cuba were horrible. You tell the stories but they're hard to believe.

As news of the horrible conditions in the compound reached Miami, Cuban exiles rallied in support of the refugees. They sent telegrams to the White House urging the Carter administration to intervene, and they organized food and clothing drives through their churches and civic organizations. In just one day, Spanish-language radio station WQBA in Miami raised over one hundred thousand dollars for the refugees' emergency care. Most of their supplies never reached the embassy, however; the Cuban government reportedly blocked all international relief efforts.

3. Die Verhandlungen über die Botschaftsflüchtlinge

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At rallies and demonstrations, angry citizens burned American flags and hung Uncle Sam in effigy.

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Bei Aufmärschen und Demonstrationen verbrannten ärgerliche kubanische Bürger amerikanische Flaggen und erhängten Uncle Sam als Puppe.

The emigration plan that was eventually negotiated by the governments of Peru and Cuba required the assistance of several countries. Peru was unable to offer asylum to more than one thousand of the refugees, and so it appealed for help to the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the member nations of the Andean Pact. The Carter administration authorized the acceptance of thirty-five hundred refugees, and Costa Rica, Spain, Ecuador, Argentina, Canada, France, and West Germany pledged to accept a total of twenty-five hundred. While four thousand refugees remained unaccounted for, Costa Rica agreed to accept them on a temporary basis with assurances from Peru and the United States that they would find homes for them. The U.S. eventually took in a total of sixty-two hundred of the embassy refugees.

The airlift negotiated by Peru provided Cuba with an acceptable solution to the crisis: the island was rid of eleven thousand dissidents at little or no expense to the Cuban government. Castro granted the refugees salvoconductas, or safe passage, so they could leave the embassy and wait for their exit permits at home. Most of the refugees accepted the offer and returned home to bathe and eat, and to say goodbye to their relatives and friends, though several hundred chose to remain at the compound, fearful that Cuban authorities would not honor their pledge and would arrest them once they left Peruvian jurisdiction. Their fears proved reasonable: a number of people who left the embassy were later denied exit permits and found themselves without homes or jobs. The six original gate-crashers were among those denied exit permits.

The airlift began on April 16. Under the terms of the negotiations, the refugees flew first to Costa Rica before continuing on to their final destination. Journalists from around the world converged at the Juan Santamaria Airport in San Jose to document the refugees' arrival. They filmed the refugees defiantly shouting "Freedom!" and "Down with Castro!" as they left their planes, or kissing the airport tarmac, or tearfully embracing. These simple yet powerful images ultimately did more harm to Castro's regime than any counterrevolutionary plot. After years of promoting an image abroad as the model socialist state, Cuba now appeared as a society in crisis. The government claimed that these were the bums and delinquents of Cuban society, but the journalists' interviews with the refugees suggested otherwise: these were ordinary citizens who said they preferred the isolation of exile to the repression in Cuba.

Castro abruptly suspended the flights to Costa Rica four days after they began, claiming that the United States and Peru were using the Costa Rican connection for "publicity and demagogic purposes." Henceforth, he announced, Cubans could only travel on flights that took them directly to their final destination. To counteract the negative publicity, the government staged a massive rally and parade to commemorate the nineteenth anniversary of the victory at the Bay of Pigs and granted visas to hundreds of foreign journalists to cover the events. Close to a million loyal citizens, including Che Guevara's father, turned out to demonstrate their support. They marched in front of the Peruvian embassy for thirteen hours, chanting "jQue se vayan!" (Let them go) and "jAbajo con la gusanera!" (Down with the worms). Cuban newspapers and magazines printed special issues to commemorate both the anniversary and the march, and Granma published letters of support from Cuba's allies in the Eastern bloc.

The rallies and marches continued over the next several weeks. One million people marched to the Plaza de la Revolucion during the annual May Day celebration. In a speech denouncing those who chose to emigrate, Castro reiterated his government's position: "We say to those who do not have the genes of revolutionaries, or the blood of revolutionaries, or who do not have the necessary discipline and heroism for a revolution: we don't want you, we don't need you." Several heads of state, including Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Maurice Bishop of Grenada, attended the rally. Nobel prize winning author Gabriel Garcia Marquez of Colombia, among others, expressed support through letters and telegrams. One month later, in yet another symbolic effort to strengthen national resolve, the Cuban government turned the Peruvian embassy compound into a historical museum—El Museo del Pueblo Combatiente (Museum of the People in Combat)—to honor their countrymen's courage during this crisis. Exhibited in the new museum were the blood-stained clothes of Ortiz Cabrera and enlarged photographs of some of the embassy refugees' alleged criminal records.

After the Costa Rican fiasco, the Cuban government focused all its hostility on the United States. The refugees were now portrayed as pawns in a Yankee imperialist plot. In mid-April, when U.S. armed forces staged military and naval exercises at Guantanamo Base, the government launched a vehement anti-American propaganda campaign. At rallies and demonstrations, angry citizens burned American flags and hung Uncle Sam in effigy. They rallied outside the U.S. Interests Section and accosted any Cuban seen entering or leaving the offices. One especially brutal incident occurred on May 4, as state police attacked more than seven hundred Cubans lined up in front of the U.S. Interests Section to request visas. Dozens were injured, and up to four hundred took refuge inside the Interests Section, where they hid for days. Granma accused the Interests Section of provoking the incident; in response, the Interests Section closed its visa offices, and they remained closed for the next five months. Anti-American sentiment became so intense on the island that Washington temporarily recalled seventeen diplomats and their families from Havana.

At the time of the airlift's suspension, some seventy-five hundred Cubans had emigrated.
Three days later, Castro substituted a new plan to rid the island not only of the remaining asylum-seekers but of thousands of other dissidents as well—a plan partially inspired by emigres in Miami.

4. Die Mariel-Überfahrt

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Many of the emigres who sailed to Mariel didn't even have friends or relatives in Cuba; they risked their lives and spent their life savings on the voyage because they considered it their moral obligation to assist anyone who wanted to leave the island

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Viele der Exilkubaner die nach Mariel segelten hatten keine Freunde oder Verwandte in Kuba, sie riskierten ihr Leben und ihre Ersparnisse für die Überfahrt, weil sie es als seine moralische Pflicht ansahem, denen zu helfen, die die Insel verlassen wollten.

Back on April 19, several adventurous emigres had taken advantage of the confusion and sailed to Cuba, where they successfully negotiated the release of their families (and forty-nine from the Peruvian embassy). Realizing that other emigres would follow, as they had in several days before receiving any response, and the port became so jammed with boats that newcomers had to dock out at sea. One participant in the flotilla commented that if all the boats had been lined up one behind the other, their relatives could have walked back to Key West. At night, Cuban gunboats patrolled the waters and police patrolled the coast, both to prevent any subversive activity and to prevent any Cubans from swimming out to the boats. As the emigres waited, they ran out of fuel, food, and water, and had to buy them from the government—at up to ten dollars for a ham sandwich, fifteen dollars for a gallon of gasoline. Those emigres who could afford to do so stayed at the Triton Hotel in Havana, which was set aside for them by the Cuban government. When their relatives finally arrived at the port, the emigres were informed that they also had to transport anyone else the Cuban government told them to take. Those who refused to cooperate were prohibited from leaving. In many cases, Cuban officials forced emigres to return to Key West with a boatload of strangers and no relatives at all. The returning boats were so overloaded with passengers that many of them broke down at sea and had to be rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. Recalled one emigre:

One of the most incredible cases involved a boat that was so overcrowded. . . . They ran into bad weather and a wave toppled them. Fourteen people died, I think, but many more have not been found [and are presumed dead]. Among the dead was an entire family—mother, father, two daughters, and a grandmother—who drowned. The only member of the family saved was a fourteen year old girl. . . . [The stories of Mariel] are all very sad stories that the world, I think, does not want to believe.

By the end of May, the Coast Guard had conducted 989 search and rescue operations and rescued thousands of stranded passengers. They had also recorded twenty-five fatalities.

Poet and novelist Reinaldo Arenas was one of the thousands who emigrated via the port of Mariel. In his collection of essays, Necesidad de libertad he recounted the details of his migration, a process he compared to "livestock on stampede." Arenas's experience was typical: he left the port of Mariel on a small boat called the San Ldzaro whose captain, a Cuban emigre from Miami, risked financial ruin to sail to Cuba to pick up his relatives. Cuban officials forced him to crowd thirty strangers onto his boat, among them a psychotic patient from a state institution who was being forced to emigrate. When the San Lazaro was 1965, the Cuban government decided that a flotilla could be used in its best interests. On April 20, the government announced that all Cubans who wished to leave the island would be permitted to do so and urged them to call their relatives in the United States to come pick them up. The port of Mariel, some twenty miles west of Havana, would be the new emigration center. Camps were quickly set up around the port to process the thousands of Cubans expected to leave.

Most emigres in Miami did not wait for their relatives to call. When news broke out that Castro had opened the port of Mariel, they rushed to the nearest marina to rent any available boat. By the end of the week, an estimated five hundred boats had sailed into the port, and hundreds of others followed over the next few weeks. Some came from as far away as New York and New Jersey. To minimize their risks in the short but dangerous trip across the Florida Straits, emigres teamed up and traveled in squadrons of up to fifty boats. Those who did not know how to sail found a large pool of sailors and fishermen in Key West willing to transport any number of Cubans for the right fee. Many of the emigres who sailed to Mariel didn't even have friends or relatives in Cuba; they risked their lives and spent their life savings on the voyage because they considered it their moral obligation to assist anyone who wanted to leave the island. By May 4, more than one thousand boats had returned from Mariel with over thirteen thousand refugees. Thousands more arrived every day for the next few months.

The U.S. Coast Guard, the INS, and other federal authorities tried to discourage the flotilla, warning the exile community that those who sailed to Cuba violated U.S. immigration laws and faced possible fines. As in Camarioca fifteen years before, however, these warnings did not deter the emigres. Most were willing to pay any price to get their families out of Cuba. The government's warnings drew criticism from the exile community and even from some federal officials. "I want to see the guy who arrests some Cuban for picking up his parents," said one U.S. Customs agent. ”Sometimes people forget this is America." The Cuban government also criticized this policy and accused the U.S. government of hypocritically welcoming illegal immigration when it suited propaganda purposes and now turning away legitimate immigrants.

Emigres were aware that there were risks in sailing to Cuba, but nothing prepared them for what they encountered at Mariel, or the "Bay of Fools," as the port was nicknamed. As each boat reached the port, the "captain" presented Cuban officials with a list of relatives he or she wished to take back to the United States. The boats then had to wait several miles out to sea it broke down from the weight, and the current took the boat further out into the Atlantic. They drifted aimlessly for three days, without food or water, until finally being rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and taken to Key West. They arrived ill, sunburned, weak from thirst and hunger, but relieved to be in the United States. "There were thousands of us wanting to come to [Key West] and kiss the earth," said Arenas. "That day we became human beings."

5. Die Ankunft in den USA

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For a short time, Cubans were even housed in dog kennels that had been converted into emergency lodgings

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Für eine kurze Zeit wurden die Kubaner in Hundezwingern untergebracht, welche zu Notunterkünften umgewandelt wurden.

As in the previous Cuban migrations, a large and complex bureaucracy evolved to register and assist the new immigrants. The first arrivals were processed in Key West, but as their numbers increased two other processing centers were established in south Florida: one at Miami's Tami-ami Park and another in the Opa-Locka barracks. There they were photographed, fingerprinted, and given medical tests. Volunteers helped the refugees fill out extensive questionnaires asking them about their families, employment history, political sympathies, and the types of groups and activities they had participated in back in Cuba. One volunteer at Opa-Locka recalled her experiences:

Working at Opa-Locka was very tiring because it was a very large place, very noisy, and very hot. . . .We found that the people we interviewed were simple, modest, humble, understanding. They were all very tired. They had spent a terrible time at the camp they call "El Mosquito" [a holding camp outside Mariel] and they were eager to settle down and begin a new life. It was amazing how many children came and how many older people came. But it was also amazing to see so many young men alone . . . fourteen, sixteen, thirty years of age.

Voluntary relief agencies provided the refugees with medical care, food, clothing, and toiletries. While they waited to be processed, released to relatives, or resettled, they were housed in churches, gymnasiums, recreation centers, hotels, National Guard armories, and even the Orange Bowl stadium, which the government leased until football season started. Two processing centers, Krome North and Krome South, were opened to house and process the Cubans, along with the growing number of Haitians who were also arriving in south Florida during this period. For a short time, Cubans were even housed in dog kennels that had been converted into emergency lodgings. Officials worked around the clock to register the Cubans and release them to their families as quickly as possible. Those who had no families or friends in the United States were detained for longer periods of time; without a sponsor (an individual or institution such as a church willing to assume responsibility for their care and supervision), the government could not release them into society. The government eventually had to build "tent cities" in parks and underneath expressways to house those with little chance of immediate sponsorship. The largest tent city was built underneath Interstate 95 on the eastern perimeter of Miami's Little Havana.

By May 6, the Carter administration had declared a state of emergency in Florida and released $10 million from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to establish a processing camp at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Meanwhile, four hundred marines were sent to Key West to maintain order and assist the incoming refugees. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), best known for managing crises caused by natural disasters, assumed responsibility for coordinating the work of the VOLAGs. The federal government opened up three additional camps to house and register Cubans: Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (opened May 8), Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania (May 17), and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin (May 29). Almost half of the Mariel immigrants, 62,541 Cubans, waited for sponsorship in these camps. Some stayed a few days, others remained for over a year.

6. Die Terrorakte gegen die Ausreisewilligen

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The Cuban government encouraged actos de repudio (acts of repudiation) against those who applied to leave the country via Mariel, and gangs of thugs accosted them on the street and at work or school, or pelted their homes with rocks, bottles, and spoiled food during nightly rampages. A volunteer at Opa-Locka recalls that one man arrived with both his arms broken, and many others had bruises, welts, and severe wounds.

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Die kubanische Regierung ermunterte zu “Schamhandlungen“ gegen diejenigen, die das Land über Mariel verlassen wollten, und Schlägertrupps überfielen diese auf offener Strasse oder auf dem Arbeitsplatz oder der Schule oder bewarfen bei nächtlichen Überfällen deren Häuser mit Steinen, Flaschen oder verfaulten Lebensmitteln.

Ein Freiwilliger erinnert sich, dass einem Mann beide Arme gebrochen worden waren, und viele andere hatten Brandwunden, Schnittwunden oder andere schwere Verletzungen.

People who interviewed and registered the Cubans heard astonishing tales of human rights abuses. The Cuban government encouraged actos de repudio (acts of repudiation) against those who applied to leave the country via Mariel, and gangs of thugs accosted them on the street and at work or school, or pelted their homes with rocks, bottles, and spoiled food during nightly rampages. A volunteer at Opa-Locka recalls that one man arrived with both his arms broken, and many others had bruises, welts, and severe wounds. Most Cubans had had to wait for days before Cuban officials transported them to the port, and in the meantime they lost their jobs and ration coupons, and in some cases their homes. At El Mosquito and other holding camps near Mariel they endured more insults. Few were given any food. Before they could leave the country, they had to sign documents confessing that they were social deviants and had committed crimes against the state. With one signature, decent, hard-working citizens established fictional records as burglars, arsonists, murderers, rapists, and CIA agents. At the pier, officials forced them to board any available boat, but not before taking away all their personal belongings: money, suitcases, jewelry, wedding rings, and even address books with the names and phone numbers of relatives living in exile. By the time they arrived at Key West, the refugees were sunburned, frightened, weak from illness or malnutrition, and without any personal belongings or documentation.

Many Cubans, knowing that the government expedited the exit papers of criminals, went to police stations to register as prostitutes and delinquents. Others were forced to leave whether they wanted to or not. "I had a neighbor whose husband was expelled via Mariel," said one Cuban, "and she never found out until he contacted her from the United States." She added:
If you were willing to leave your house, all furnished, to the government, then sometimes they let you leave. I have some friends who had a very beautiful house. They told her that she had to leave. When she said that she couldn't, because her husband was in prison [as a counterrevolutionary], they told her that they were transporting her husband directly from prison to Mariel. They lied! She later had to purchase his freedom through Panama. They told her that so she would leave her house.
A number of the refugees had either physical or mental disabilities. An estimated fifteen hundred had mental health problems or were mentally retarded; five hundred of these were judged to need long-term institutionalization, while another five hundred were eventually placed in halfway houses. Exact numbers were hard to determine, since spouses and children often hid or covered for their mentally ill relatives for fear that they would all be sent back to Cuba. An estimated sixteen hundred had chronic medical problems such as drug and alcohol abuse, tuberculosis, or cardiovascular disease. Four had Hansen's disease (leprosy). To meet the health care needs of the camp residents, each camp maintained hospital wards, including psychiatric care units.

7. Die Verleumdung der Ausreisewilligen als Kriminelle

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Unfortunately, the American press focused an exaggerated amount of attention on those with mental disabilities and on the hardcore felons. While the latter constituted less than 4 percent of the total number of entrants, they commanded almost all of the media attention.

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Unglücklicherweise konzentrierte sich die amerikanische Presse auf die Fälle von Geistesgestörten und notorischen Straftätern. Die letzteren stellten lediglich 4% der Emigranten dar. Trotzdem richtete sich die Aufmerksamkeit auf diese.

Most distressing to U.S. officials, however, was the discovery that thousands of the Mariel emigrants—twenty-six thousand by the end of the boatlift—had criminal records. (One of the Cubans who arrived at Key West had been responsible for hijacking a U.S. airline to Cuba a few years earlier.) Estimates varied, but of these twenty-six thousand approximately two thousand had committed serious felonies in Cuba. Most of these were sent to the Federal Correctional Institution at Talladega, Alabama, for further screening and possible exclusion. The majority of the offenders, however, had served time for lesser crimes. Under Cuba's ley de peligrosidad (law of dangerousness), Cubans could be incarcerated for such offenses as alcoholism, gambling, drug addiction, homosexuality, prostitution, "extravagant behavior," vagrancy, and dealing on the black market. Many of the "criminals" fell under this category; they had served terms ranging from a few months to a few years at a work farm. Others had served time for political crimes—longer terms, usually, some up to two decades in a maximum security prison. Still others had been jailed for refusing to conform to revolutionary norms: these included members of religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Seventh Day Adventists which discouraged military participation, as well as draft dodgers and conscientious objectors to the war in Africa.

Unfortunately, the American press focused an exaggerated amount of attention on those with mental disabilities and on the hardcore felons. While the latter constituted less than 4 percent of the total number of entrants, they commanded almost all of the media attention. Few journalists ever mentioned the fact that up to 80 percent of the Mariel Cubans had no criminal history, nor did they mention that many of those who had served time in prison did so for crimes not recognized in the United States. Instead, they focused on the disturbing details of Castro's plan to rid the island of undesirables. Newspapers printed story after story of how the Cuban government rounded up the criminals and "social deviants," transported them to Mariel, and forced them to board the boats. Most of the stories were highly sensationalistic and based on rumor rather than fact. The Washington Post, for example, including homosexuals in its list of "deviants," reported that up to twenty thousand of the Cubans were homosexuals (the actual number was closer to one thousand). Such sensationalism gave Americans a warped view of the new immigrants, and the Cubans of Mariel ultimately suffered for it.

The shift in public perception of the Cubans came abruptly. Most Americans initially sympathized with the plight of the Cubans: stories of the refugees' courage at the Peruvian embassy provided the only heartening news in a year of gloomy headlines, and Americans applauded their defiance of the Castro regime. Around the country, editorials in the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and other major newspapers urged the federal government to extend humanitarian assistance to the refugees and to grant them political asylum. The Carter administration shared this perspective. In a speech before the League of Women Voters in Philadelphia on May 3, President Carter reiterated his strong support for human rights in Latin America and declared that the United States would provide "an open heart and open arms" to the people fleeing from Cuba

@ Jemen-Moskito

Warum benutzt Du den AIDS-Thread, um über die Marielito-Kubaner herzuziehen. Ist es Dir peinlich von den Verbrechen Deines Führers Castros zu lesen?

@ Jemen-Moskito

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Nicht hunderttausende Menschen, sondern genauer 125.000 haben Kuba 1980 verlassen

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Immerhin weit mehr als 100.000, mämlich 125.000 oder weit mehr als 1% der gesamten Bevölkerung innerhalb weniger Wochen.
Hätte Castro nicht abrupt die Häfen wieder gesperrt, wären wohl noch mehr abgehauen. Dazu kommen noch die, die man nicht gehen liess, ebenfalls Tausende.

Zählt man all die dazu, die früher oder später Kuba verliessen oder im Meer ersoffen oder von Haien gefressen worden sind, dann sind dies nicht nur Hunderttausende, sondern Millionen.

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Es waren nicht politische Dissidenten und Verfolgte eines kommunistischen Terrorregimes, wie Vilmaris gerne glauben machen will.

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96% der Gefängnisinsassen wurden wegen in den USA oder Deutschland nicht strafwürdigen Verbrechen zu Haftstrafen verurteilt.
Darunter befanden sich immerhin 5.486 politische Häftlinge, rund ein Viertel aller Gefängnisinsassen.

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Die Masse der Bootsflüchtlinge waren auch keine Künstler und Intellektuellen (R. Arenas ist ein Einzelfall).

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Das ist eine Tautologie, da, lieber Jemen, schwerlich ein Staat von Schriftstellern oder Sozialarbeitern leben kann. Es muss auch Leute geben, die schon einmal eine Fabrik von innen gesehen haben, was bei Dir leider nachweisbar nicht der Fall ist.

Allerdings, und das ist wichtig, in der Flüchtlingswelle waren die führenden Intellektuellen Kubas, welche sämtlich Publikationsverbot in Kuba hatten und später in Florida die berühmte Zeitschrift „Revista Mariel“ gründeten

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Der typische Bootsflüchtling war jung, schwarz, arm und oft auch kriminell (was in Kuba ja bekanntlich nichts Ungewöhnliches ist).

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Das ist alles nachweislich falsch. Lediglich 30% - 40% waren Schwarze und lediglich 2-4% Kriminelle.

In Antwort auf:

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Die Marielitos waren Armutsflüchtlinge

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Motivationen lassen sich schlecht klar trennen. Richtig ist, dass Castro es schaffte, Kuba vom Einwanderungsland Nr. 1 zum Armenhaus der Karibik zu machen.
Kubaner, die das nicht gut fanden und sich dem Staatsterror widersetzten, sei es durch politische Aktivitäten, Religion, Kriegsdienstverweigerung, Homosexualität, privates Unternehmertum wurden zu langjährigen Haftstrafen verurteilt oder sozial isoliert und schikaniert.

In Antwort auf:

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Der Exodus war ein aus Miami gesteuertes und mit Booten der Gusanos durchgeführtes Unternehmen.

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Auch das ist nachweislich falsch. Die Unruhen begannen mit Fluchtversuche in lateinamerikanische Botschaften. Es gab keinerlei Einfluss aus Miami, es waren spontane Aktionen verzweifelten Bürger.

@ Uwe S.

In Antwort auf:

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das castro damals seine gefaengnisse leer gemacht hat, wissen wir doch alle.
das wort gusano in dem zusammenhang zu verwenden, ist einfach nur ekelhaft. was sagt ede dazu?]

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Viele wurden dem Willkürgesetz „Ley de la Peligrosidad“ (Gefährlichkeitsgesetz), welches heute noch in Kraft ist, eingesperrt, u.a. wegen

- Versuch Kuba illegal zu verlassen
- Politischem Widerstand (viele hatten Jahrzehnte lang in Isolationshaft eingesessen)
- Kriegsdienstverweigerung in Angola
- Schwarzmarktgeschäften
- „Sozial“ unerwünschtem Verhalten
- Homosexualität
- Mitgliedschaft in religiösen Organisationen (Zeugen Jehovas)
- Prostitution

usw.

Die Mehrzahl der Flüchtlinge kam aus einfachen Berufen wie Arbeiter, Maurer, Zimmermann oder Busfahrer. Der Anteil der dunkelhäutigen Kubaner lag bei ca. 30-40%.

Quelle:

Die klassische Studie über die Mariel-Flüchtlinge wurde von Bach/Bach 1981 verfasst: „The Flotilla Entrants“.

In Antwort auf:

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Who were the Marielitos? Were they “scum”?

To dispel the more damaging and inaccurate portrayals, Robert Bach (1980; Bach et al. 1981/82) studied their characteristics, sampling the Marielitos soon after their arrival, while they were still in the processing centers and the refugee camps. Among the most salient was their youth (most were young men single or without their families) and the visibly higher proportion of Blacks than ever (Bach et al. 1981/82, pp. 33-35). Their former occupations showed that most were from the mainstream of the Cuban economy, hardly scum. Also salient was their overwhelmingly working class origins — close to 71 percent were blue-collar workers. Mechanics, heavy equipment and factory machine operatives, carpenters, masons, and bus, taxi, and truck drivers led the list of occupations (Bach et al. 1981/82, p. 34). These characteristics, stressed Fernández (1982), suggested new generational strains may have developed from the more limited economic and political opportunities available to the young when the older generation of Cubans who made the revolution held the key posts, as well as the burden of military service in Cuba and overseas shouldered by the young (cf. Díaz-Briquets 1983). “Those who hope” might well characterize this wave.

In the United Sates, the press focused inordinately on the criminal element. Indeed, there were many who had been in prison. According to the the Immigration and Naturalization Service, of the 124,789 Mariel refugees around 19 percent, or 23,970, admitted they had been in jail in Cuba. Of those who had been in prison, 5,486 were political prisoners, while 70 percent of those who had been in prison had been jailed for minor crimes or for acts, such as vagrancy or participation in the extensive black market that were crimes in Cuba but not in the United States.

The Cuban Ley de la Peligrosidad (Law of Dangerous Behavior) made some forms of dissent “anti-social” behavior, controlled by prison terms, such as participating in the black market (buying or selling clothes and food); dodging military service or desertion; refusing to work for the state, particularly in the cane fields; and trying to escape Cuba illegally (Bach et al. 1981/82, p. 46). Of those who had been in jail, the immigration service considered only 7 percent to be serious criminals — less than 2 percent of all the Marielitos (Montgomery 1981).

Given their youth, the Marielitos clearly constituted a different political generation, one whose coming of age was long after the early revolutionary struggle and sharp social cleavages that demanded enormous sacrifices but also affirmed the loyalty of many. Roughly half of the Mariel immigrants came of age during the late 1960s or the 1970s, when problems of freedom of expression became particularly acute for artists and intellectuals, such as the incident sparked by Heberto Padilla’s poem expressing the marginality of those who were “Fuera del Juego” (“Out of the Game”). Moreover, deviance, particularly homosexuality, was scorned and dealt with by prison sentence.

The majority of the offenders, however, had served time for lesser crimes. Under Cuba's ley de peligrosidad (law of dangerousness), Cubans could be incarcerated for such offenses as alcoholism, gambling, drug addiction, homosexuality, prostitution, "extravagant behavior," vagrancy, and dealing on the black market.

Many of the "criminals" fell under this category; they had served terms ranging from a few months to a few years at a work farm. Others had served time for political crimes—longer terms, usually, some up to two decades in a maximum security prison. Still others had been jailed for refusing to conform to revolutionary norms: these included members of religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Seventh Day Adventists which discouraged military participation, as well as draft dodgers and conscientious objectors to the war in Africa.

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@ Jemen-Mosquito

In Antwort auf:

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Die Masse der Bootsflüchtlinge waren auch keine Künstler und Intellektuellen (R. Arenas ist ein Einzelfall).

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Hier noch ein kurzer Hinweis, für die Analphabeten, die MININT-Autoren wie Leonardo Padura für Schriftsteller halten.

http://www.ucm.es/info/especulo/numero23/gmariel.html