Aus der kanadischen Zeitschrift FOCAL - dem Wirtschaftsministerium nahestehend.
Wirklich nicht schlecht die Tante. Sie benutzt sogar das Seignorage-Argument. (Ausser Quimbombó dürfte keiner wissen, was das überhaupt ist )
Alllerdings nicht alles ganz zu Ende gedacht.

http://www.focal.ca/fpoint/focalpoint_nov-dec04.pdf

November/December 2004, Volume 3, Number 10 FOCAL POINT Spotlight on the Americas

Cracking Nest Eggs
Ana Yanes

On October 25 Fidel Castro announced that November 8 would mark the end of his government’s acceptance of US-dollar commercial transactions. After November 14, Cubans, foreign tourists, foreign companies’ staff and the diplomatic corps will pay the Cuban authorities a surcharge of 10% to exchange US currency into the domestic issued “convertible peso”.

Francisco Soberón, President of Cuba’s central bank, has described the move as an effective way to deal the United States a “severe blow” by withdrawing its currency from circulation. But we must wonder how far the “severe blow” will reach and who will actually feel its effects in the short and medium-terms.

In the short-term, the measures brought an obvious flow of US dollars into Cuban government coffers. More than 2.5 million transactions were reported to have occurred where US dollars were converted into “chavitos” (little pennies), a popular Cuban name for the less-trusted “convertible peso”. Technically, it is true that whenever a US-dollar note stops circulating, the US government that printed it ;roughly at a cost of paper and ink; suffers a loss. For example, suppose Cubans crack their nest eggs and, whether they like it or not, give their government a US$350 million gift. A numerical example suggests that this gift—currency taken out of circulation—to the Cuban government equates to a US$7 million cost to the United States. Surely the “severe blow” to the US economy can be described more accurately as an “imperceptible breeze”. So what is the real point of this policy change? In order to determine what the Cuban government is actually trying to achieve we must look at what interest rate the Cuban government would have to pay on a US$350 million loan if it had taken one out instead of receiving funds from its own citizens.

First, we must establish if the Cuban government could ever access that amount from international sources. The Cuban centralized state economy ranks among the 6 riskiest debtors, because it has defaulted on its debt for almost 20 years, refused to accept its debt to its main creditor—Russia—and owes almost its entire GDP. Still, for the sake of argument, suppose the Cuban government could get quick access to a US$350 million loan at 20% interest. It would still be behind US$70 million in the transaction. Certainly this hurricane of cash flowing into the US$32 billion inefficient Cuban state economy as a result of this policy change is more significant than the minuscule damage to the US economy.

Meanwhile, a severe blow is indeed being dealt, though it is not being dealt to the United States, but to Cubans. Cubans overseas will have to bear the increased transaction costs for sending money to their relatives on the island or watch them lack bare necessities. And those on the island will have to either exchange their savings into a currency they know is worthless outside Cuba, or keep them in US dollars, where they are subject to an uncertain future of increased costs and even the threat of eventual forced conversion.

The medium-term consequences would be associated with two of Cuba’s major income sources: tourism, which brings in US$2 billion a year, 75% of this from non-US-dollar countries, and remittances, which are sent mainly from the United States and are estimated to be between US$0.7 and US$1 billion a year. The Cuban government is hoping not to affect tourism income through its new policy by allowing tourists easy access to exchange. The government is also hoping to keep a stable remittances income, assuming that Cubans abroad will assume the higher transaction costs, and that Cubans on the island will use the “chavito”.

Some analysts have predicted a potential drop in remittances in response to increased transaction costs. The logic behind this prediction goes “if ketchup A becomes more expensive its sales will drop”. However, this drop will only be pronounced if consumers are buying more ketchup B or any other substitute instead. In the absence of substitutes, demand becomes less responsive to price, that is inelastic. When the only local phone company raises prices, demand does not drop in response but the company’s income increases as a result. Similarly, the Cuban government is likely to see a stable remittances income if: Cubans’ access to necessities depends on remittances; the only donors’ choice is the Cuban government transfer mechanism; and, the only supplier for Cubans on the island are the government stores.

In case nationals do not “trust” their “revolutionary government” enough to spontaneously ask for “chavitos” in exchange for their remittances, government-operated businesses are being barred from accepting US dollars. At the same time, the government will likely keep the dollar legal for possession until the waters settle, rather than risk current US dollar remittances and tourism income.

The fact that possessing US currency will remain legal is not a trivial matter in the repressive Cuban society: Cuban citizens who posses US dollars will be easy repression targets in the near future. There could be a downside to asking for your remittances in US dollars at the government exchange houses in Cuba. Given that the black market is an alternative to the government stores, it is likely to expand, along with repression. Cubans who choose the US dollar will signal themselves as potential black-market participants, against their “revolutionary government’s efforts”. Along with avoiding the 10% surcharge, fear of future repression may have also contributed to the massive exchange of US dollars into “chavitos”.

The new twist in the sui generis Cuban monetary policy is providing the Cuban government with an instant avalanche of cash in the short-term, while clearing the way for the medium-term movement of remittances into easier-to-handle hard currencies, given the tightened US controls on international banks. The cost of the move is that it has already increased internal discontent and non-state activity. In Cuba, the choice of currency is again highly charged with politics and uncertainty.

Ana Yanes is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Economics, Carleton University

In Antwort auf:

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Sie benutzt sogar das Seignorage-Argument. (Ausser Quimbombó dürfte keiner wissen, was das überhaupt ist )

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O.K. heute will ich mal nicht so sein.

In Antwort auf:

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“Seignorage”

Glossary from Econterms

Definition: Seignorage is "The amount of real purchasing power that [a] government can extract from the public by printing money." -- Cukierman 1992

Explanation: When a government prints money, it is in essence borrowing interest-free since it receives goods in exchange for the money, and must accept the money in return only at some future time. It gains further if issuing new money reduces (through inflation) the value of old money by reducing the liability that the old money represents. These gains to a money-issuing government are called "seignorage" revenues.

The original meaning of seignorage was the fee taken by a money issuer (a government) for the cost of minting the money. Money itself, at that time, was intrinsically valuable because it was made of metal.

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